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Abstract. People accept a high number of computer pop-ups containing cues that 
indicate malevolence when they occur as interrupting tasks during a cognitively 
demanding memory-based task [1, 2], with younger adults spending only 5.5-6-
seconds before making an accept or decline decision [2]. These findings may be 
explained by at least three factors: pressure to return to the suspended task to 
minimize forgetting; adopting non-cognitively demanding inspection strategies; 
and, having low levels of suspicion [3]. Consequences of such behavior could be 
potentially catastrophic for individuals and organizations (e.g., in the event of a 
successful cyber breach), and thus it is crucial to develop effective interventions 
to reduce susceptibility. The current experiment (N = 50) tested the effectiveness 
of malevolence cue identification training (MCIT) interventions. During phase 1, 
participants performed a serial recall task with some trials interrupted by pop-up 
messages with accept or cancel options that either contained cues (e.g., missing 
company name, misspelt word) to malevolence (malevolent condition) or no cues 
(non-malevolent condition). In phase 2, participants were allocated to one of three 
groups: no MCIT / Control, non-incentivized MCIT / N-IMCIT, or incentivized 
MCIT / IMCIT. Control group participants only had to identify category-related 
words (e.g., colors). Participants in intervention conditions were explicitly made 
aware of the malevolence cues in Phase 1 pop-ups before performing trying to 
identify malevolence cues within adapted passages of text. The N-IMCIT group 
were told that their detection accuracy was being ranked against other partici-
pants, to induce social comparison. Phase 3 was similar to phase 1, although 50% 
of malevolent pop-ups contained new cues. MCIT did lead to a significant reduc-
tion in the number of malevolent pop-ups accepted under some conditions. In-
centivized training did not (statistically) improve performance compared to non-
incentivized training. Cue novelty had no effect. Ways of further improving the 
MCIT training protocol used, as well as theoretical implications, are discussed. 
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1 Introduction 
The prevalence of malevolent online communications (MOCs), such as phishing at-
tempts, is growing at a rapid pace. Recent statistics indicate that 264,483 phishing re-
ports were made in the third quarter of 2018, which is markedly higher than the same 
quarter in 2016 [4]. The UK Government commissioned a report with the research re-
vealing a staggering 46% of UK businesses reporting a breach of cyber-security, in-
cluding phishing attempts, in the 12-months prior to being surveyed [5]. Such MOCs 
are targeted at individuals and organizations. Examples include fake pop-ups claiming 
to be from well-known companies that if clicked/accepted result in malware infection 
and/or payment demands [6]. Recent large scale disruptive attacks include Sony Pic-
tures, 2015, where employees clicked fake links resulting in login details & passwords 
being stolen, allowing fraudsters to hack-in [7]. The significance of this problem, to-
gether with other cyber threats, has been reflected by worldwide investments in cyber-
security with the likes of the UK Government and Bank of America committing funds 
to improve cybersecurity prevention and protection [8, 9]. Whilst much of this invest-
ment is being dedicated to improvements in the protection of networks, systems and 
software, computer users are seen as the main weakness in effective prevention of suc-
cessful cyber-attack breaches [10], due to multiple fallibilities related to e.g., percep-
tion, attention, memory, decision making, and risk. Many cyber hackers are aware of 
these and will exploit them when developing MOCs. The current paper examines (1) 
susceptibility to MOCs delivered when humans are under short-term memory pressure 
and (2) the efficacy of an intervention training method to reduce susceptibility.  
Pop-up messages occur regularly on networked computer devices, often unexpect-
edly and during engagement in another task(s) [11, 12]. Many contain information on 
and/or links to updates that are essential to maintain efficient performance of the com-
puter system and/or software [13]. However, there are growing numbers of fake com-
puter updates that mimic trusted companies and brands, with hackers’ intent on encour-
aging people to clink on links which can result in cyber breaches.  
Pop-ups at times will act as a distractor (e.g., if the user is able to ignore or deal with 
it without disengaging from an ongoing task) but are more likely to initiate an interrup-
tion (e.g., if the user is not able to ignore it and has to disengage from the ongoing task). 
Even short interruptions (as short as 2.8-seconds) can shift the focus of attention and 
memory and lead to increased errors within a suspended task [14] with factors such as 
interruption duration and demand exacerbating the extent of disruption [15, 16], as pre-
dicted by a leading model [17, 18]. However, few have considered how individuals 
choose to engage with interrupting tasks when there is no time constraint on their com-
pletion, i.e., when their response (which could be a few seconds) to the interrupting task 
determines when they will resume the suspended task (see [1, 2]).  
In considering pop-up messages as task interruptions, how individuals allocate re-
sources to verify authenticity will likely depend on factors outside the usual task pa-
rameters often studied, such as time costs and possible performance impairments. Ac-
cording to the Suspicion, Cognition, Automaticity Model / SCAM [3], whether malev-
olent cues are noticed within fraudulent communications depends on the depth of pro-
cessing an individual engages in. The less suspicious and more trusting an individual 
is, the more likely they are to process the content of pop-up messages using automatic 
heuristic processing compared to someone who is more suspicious and less trusting who 
will likely engage in more cognitively effortful and time consuming processing. Simi-
larly, those who have a higher need for cognitive stimulation [19], will be more suscep-
tible to influence techniques used within pop-up messages such as urgency, compliance 
with authority and avoidance of loss; at the expense of looking for suspicious aspects, 
such as message authenticity cues (e.g., correct spelling and grammar, company name). 
This leads to a prediction that an intervention training protocol that increases suspicion 
and encourages more effortful processing of pop-up message content should have car-
ryover effects to a subsequent task performed with malevolent pop-up interruptions.  
To our knowledge, only two published studies have considered human susceptibility 
to fraudulent pop-up interruptions occurring during a demanding memory-based task. 
[2] developed a paradigm where young adult participants were interrupted by one of 
three different types of pop-up message during a serial recall memory recall task. One 
third of pop-ups were designed to look genuine (genuine condition) and high in author-
ity with no cues to potential malevolence. Another third (mimicked condition) were also 
high in authority but contained cues to suggest malevolence. The other third were also 
of a malevolent nature and low authority (i.e., contained no authority details relating to 
the source of the pop-up such as company name, logo, or website link). Participants had 
to decide whether to accept or decline pop-ups, at which point the primary task would 
be reinstated at the point of interruption. Predictions informed by parameters of SCAM 
[3] were supported, with an alarming 63% of mimicked pop-ups accepted compared 
with 66% in the genuine condition. Even more worrying was that 56% of low authority 
pop-ups were accepted. Participants spent on average only ~5.5-6-seconds viewing 
pop-up message content before committing to a response. When there were no time 
constraints to resume an interrupted task, participants accepted a slightly higher per-
centage (72%) of genuine pop-ups and slightly fewer (55%) mimicked pop-ups. This 
suggests that even without other cognitive and time pressures, people are still not very 
good at detecting malevolent cues within mimicked pop-up interruptions. [1] reported 
similar findings with older adults. Participants demonstrated higher levels of suscepti-
bility to malevolent pop-ups during an interrupted memory recall phase, despite spend-
ing significant more time (~10.5-11-s) viewing them than in [1]. Fitting with SCAM-
based low suspicion and automaticity predictions [3], both studies demonstrate very 
high levels of human susceptibility to malevolent pop-up interruptions that occur during 
a demanding memory-based task. However, concerns remain as neither study showed 
marked malevolent detection improvements when time pressure was not a factor.   
Given these results, it is important further develop and test interventions to reduce 
susceptibility to computer-based communications such as malevolent pop-up messages. 
Education-based training interventions are not always effective [20] with some finding 
that people are more suspicious of scams that they are familiar with versus those that 
are less familiar [21]. [22] tested the effectiveness of emails containing cues to malev-
olence although found that not all people read and processed the content to a deep 
enough level to identify them effectively. These findings fit SCAM parameters regard-
ing the use of automatic heuristic processing strategies, especially when suspicion is 
low. It could be that training effectiveness is dependent on the extent of encouragement 
to engage in and cognitively process training materials. Another factor that could po-
tentially increase engagement in training is competition, which has been shown to fa-
cilitate motivation and performance in some instances [23]. Short term improvements 
were found when testing a competitive e-learning interface that displayed a rank order 
for the best performing students [24]. Competitive ranking may encourage individuals 
to engage more in the task to gain an accurate appraisal of their own performance com-
pared to others, and thus improve upon such performances. The social process of eval-
uating one’s accuracy in relation to their ability may encourage a desire to improve 
performance to increase own sense of self-worth [25]. Thinking more about the content 
of the training, as well as gaining satisfaction from it, may increase the likelihood of 
the information being remembered and utilized subsequently.  
The current experiment has four main aims. One is to attempt to replicate the findings 
of [1] and [2] on susceptibility to pop-ups with cues to malevolence when they occur 
as interruptions to a memory-based task. Second, to examine whether, and if so to what 
extent, susceptibility can be alleviated through an intervention involving malevolent 
cue identification training (abbreviated to MCIT hereafter). The training was designed 
not to only increase suspicion and awareness of cues to malevolence but also to encour-
age more effortful cognitive processing of message content. Third, we examined 
whether a form of incentivized MCIT that encourages competitiveness through social 
comparison might further increase the intervention effectiveness. A fourth aim was to 
establish whether beneficial effects of MCIT transfer to conditions involving novel cues 
to malevolence that have not been experienced as part of the training intervention. 
2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
Fifty Cardiff University Psychology undergraduate students (age: 19.32; SD 1.06) 
were recruited, via opportunity sampling, in return for course credits with adequate a 
priori power (.8 detect medium to large effect sizes (Cohen’s f .25 -.4). Participants 
were first-language English or highly proficient in English as a second language, and 
had normal/correct vision. They were assigned to one of three cue identification training 
groups. There were 16 in the Non-Malevolent Cue Identification (N-MCIT)/Control 
group (M age: 19.63-years, four male), 17 in the Non-Incentivized Malevolent Cue 
Identification (N-IMCIT) group (M age: 19.06-years, six male), and 17 in the Incentiv-
ized Malevolent Cue Identification (IMCIT) group (M age: 19.29-years, two male).  
2.2 Design 
A mixed factorial design was employed. The between-participants’ independent varia-
ble (IV) was CIT Group with three levels: Control, N-IMCIT, and IMCIT. There were 
three repeated measures IVs. One was serial recall phase with two levels: Phase 1/Pre-
Intervention 1, and, Phase 3/Post-Intervention. Another was the malevolency (Message 
Type) of the pop-up with two levels: Non-Malevolent/Genuine, and, Non-Genuine/Ma-
levolent. The third (Phase 3 only) was whether malevolent pop-ups contained the same 
(Malevolent-Old) or different malevolence cues than in Phase 1. There were two main 
dependent variables (DVs). The first was decision response to the pop-up request where 
two responses were possible: Accept, or, Decline. The second was the time to make a 
response. During the intervention phase, participant performance was recorded in two 
stages. The first stage required participants to respond to whether they identified at least 
one cue to indicate a category exemplar (Control group) or cue to malevolence (other 
groups), by choosing Yes or No. If choosing Yes, participants then had to record the 
number of cues identified (maximum 3 per passage of text with five passages in total).  
2.3 Materials 
Phase 1 and 3 Serial Recall and Interruption Pop-Up Tasks  
Tasks were programmed on run on Intel® Core™ i5 PCs connected to 1920x1080 
iiyama 24” flat-panel monitors. The serial recall task was created using PsychoPy2 soft-
ware [26]. There were 18 trials in Phase 1 and 30 in Phase 3. During each trial, a dif-
ferent string of nine letters and numbers, e.g., 96KJ3785H were presented in the center 
of the screen for 9-seconds before disappearing. An instruction (‘enter code’) appeared 
after a 2-second retention interval to inform participants that they should try and recall 
and write down letters and numbers in the order in which they were presented.  
Twelve trials were interrupted in Phase 1: six with non-malevolent and six with ma-
levolent pop-ups. Six trials were not interrupted. Twenty-four trials were interrupted in 
Phase 3: twelve with non-malevolent and twelve with malevolent pop-ups, with six of 
these containing the same (Old) malevolency cues as in Phase 1 and six containing New 
cues. Pop-up messages appeared in the center of the screen after the letter/number string 
had disappeared and before the recall instruction appeared, and remained on the screen 
until either an accept (‘A’ key) or cancel (‘C’) response was registered. Immediately 
after this response, the serial recall task was reinstated from the point in which it had 
been suspended (i.e., ‘enter code’ would appear next). Each new trial was initiated after 
the spacebar was pressed. Each pop-up contained text describing the scenario, plus an 
extra line of text with an instruction (e.g., ‘Click ‘accept’ to download the [XXXX: 
name] pop -p’) with boxes for Accept and Cancel. All non-malevolent and some ma-
levolent pop-ups also contained a company logo in the top right corner and a hyperlink 
to a related website underneath text that read ‘Further information can be found here:’.  
 
 
Fig 1. Examples of a non-malevolent pop-up (left) and malevolent pop-up (right) 
 
Non-malevolent pop-ups contained cues (or indeed not lack of) to suggest that they 
were genuine (Figure 1, left). These included a company logo, name (corresponding to 
logo), and website link, and accurate grammar and accurate spelling. Malevolent pop-
ups (Figure 1, right) contained three of six cues to malevolence: lack of company logo, 
name, website link, and an instance of inaccurate grammar or a misspelt word(s). Dur-
ing Phase 3, malevolent pop-ups contained either three Old or three New cues. New 
cues included: misspelling within website link, non-capitalization of company names, 
missing a key detail, having a fake logo, or capitalization of a word that should not be.  
Prior to the start of Phase 1 and 3 trials, the following message was displayed in the 
middle of the computer screen for 15-seconds: 
 
‘This system is protected by virus protection software and pop-ups are installed on a regu-
lar basis. However, please be vigilant about the security of this system by ensuring that 
any attempts by applications to access system information of data are legitimate.’ 
 
Phase 2 Intervention and Control Non-Intervention Tasks 
Participants in the intervention conditions were given explicit information on the 
errors/cues to malevolence contained in Phase 1 malevolent pop-ups. They were also 
given a small whiteboard and marker pen to make notes on these if they wished to do 
so. All participants were required to read a set of five passages of text, with 5-minutes 
(~60-seconds per passage) from fictitious companies. The passages each contained tex-
tual information relating to five nominal categories (drinks, transport, sport, clothes, 
color). Passages were adapted for the N-IMCIT and IMCIT conditions to contain the 
same errors/cues to malevolence as in Phase 1. Participants in the Control group were 
required to first indicate whether category (e.g., color) words were present within the 
passage by clicking ‘yes’ or ‘no’ within an online answer sheet, and if choosing Yes, 
they then had to type the number of instances they could find (max = three per passage) 
before moving to the next passage. Participants in the intervention groups had to do this 
for cues indicating malevolence (max = 3 per passage) rather than category instances. 
Answer sheets were set out as a separate tab containing a table to be completed in rela-
tion to each passage. For the IMCIT group, each tab was followed by a leader board 
with performance appearing to be ranked against all previous participants with their 
position increasing after completion of each passage. Leaderboard positions were preset 
with the intention of encouraging (through social comparison) participants to try harder 
and apply more cognitive effort for each new passage.  
2.4 Procedure 
Before providing consent, participants read through an information sheet and exper-
imental instructions (which were also verbally read by the experimenter) before com-
pleting two practice trials: one with a non-interrupted serial recall task, and another with 
a serial recall task interrupted by a non-malevolent pop-up. They were not informed 
about the cyber security element of the experiment during this process. At the beginning 
of Phase 1, participants were presented with the computer security message (see Mate-
rials). After this disappeared, they were able to press the spacebar to start trial one of 
18, with 12 of the trials interrupted (see Materials). Phase 2 was the intervention phase. 
Participants read an instruction sheet appropriate for their group. All were instructed 
they had 5-minutes to read 5-passages (one-at-a-time) and complete the cue identifica-
tion task relevant to their group. The Control group had to indicate (Yes or No) whether 
the passage of text contained at least one cue relating to its category description (e.g., 
color: look for color words). If answering yes, they then had to indicate how many 
category words they could identify within the passage (i.e., 1-3). N-IMCIT and IMCIT 
groups were first given written information pertaining to the malevolency cues con-
tained within pop-ups experienced in Phase 1. These were explained verbally by the 
experimenter who checked participants’ understanding. As with the Control group, par-
ticipants in the MCIT groups were then presented with 5-passages of text, one-at-a-
time, and had to indicate (Yes or No) whether the passage it contained at least one 
trained cue indicating potential malevolence. Participants were also provided with a 
small whiteboard and marker to make notes, if desired. Phase 3 (post-intervention) in-
volved 30 serial recall trials with 24 interrupted. After Phase 3, participants completed 
demographics and pop-up awareness questionnaires. Participants were debriefed, with 
information about cyber-security and awareness aims.  
 
3 Results and Discussion 
All analyses are two-tailed with α = .05. One dataset was excluded, as it was found 
to be a statistical outlier (z-scores > 3.29, ps < .001) on more than one measure.  
 
Percentage of Pop-Up Messages Accepted/Declined  
First, we consider mean percentages of ‘malevolent’ pop-ups accepted across Phases 
1 (pre-intervention) and 3 (post-intervention), collapsing across New and Old cue ma-
levolent pop-ups in Phase 3 (Table 1). The percentage of malevolent pop-ups accepted 
looks to have decreased in Phase 3 for both MCIT groups, although increased for the 
Control group. Somewhat surprisingly, the mean percentage is markedly lower in the 
Control versus the N-IMCIT and IMCIT groups.  
A mixed 3 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Training Group as the between-
subjects variable (Control, N-IMCIT, IMCIT) and Phase (pre-intervention, post-inter-
vention) revealed non-significant main effects of Training Group, F(2, 47) = 1.07, MSE 
= .08, p = .35, and, Phase, F(1, 47) = 1.03, MSE = .04, p = .32. There was however a 
significant interaction, F(2, 47) = 3.44, MSE = .04, p = .04. Bonferroni pot-hoc tests 
revealed a non-significant (although trend) reduction in the percentage of malevolent 
pop-ups accepted in Phase 3 compared with Phase 1 for the IMCIT group (p = .07). 
However, the significant interaction might be better explained by the percentage of ma-
levolent pop-ups accepted by the Control group in Phase 1 being significantly lower 
than in the N-IMCIT and IMCIT groups within Phase 1 (ps < .025). Given this unex-
pected difference (discussed later), another mixed ANOVA, this time 2 (Training 
Group: MCIT, IMCIT) x 2 (Phase: 1, 3), was conducted. This revealed a significant 
main effect of Phase, F(1, 32) = 5.63, MSE = .04, p = .02 with a lower percentage of 
malevolent pop-ups accepted in Phase 3 than in Phase 1. There was a non-significant 
main effect of Training Group, F(1, 32) = .96, MSE = .08, p = .33, and a non-significant 
interaction, F(1, 32) = .03, MSE = .04, p = .86.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that: (1) MCIT worked in terms of reducing 
the percentage of malevolent pop-up messages accepted post-intervention, (2) IMCIT 
did not lead to better performance than N-IMCIT, and, (3) participants in the Control 
group, in Phase 1 at least, performed differently (i.e., chose to accept far less malevolent 
pop-ups) to those in MCIT conditions. In relation to (1), findings are in line with SCAM 
predictions that heightening suspicion will lead to increased cognitive and less auto-
matic processing of stimuli [3], thus improving the likelihood of identifying malevo-
lence cues. However, the percentage of malevolent pop-ups accepted was still very 
high, even after the intervention. In relation to (2), incentivized MCIT through social 
comparison (using an onscreen leaderboard technique), was not effective enough to 
cause even more suspicion and increased cognitive processing of potential cues to sug-
gest malevolence within pop-up messages compared to non-incentivized MCIT. This 
finding (despite there being a trend) is not in line with [22]and possible reasons are 
considered in the Limitations section. Considering (3), the only difference was when 
the groups were tested: The Control group were tested after the MCIT groups.  
 
Table 1. Percentage of Malevolent and Genuine pop-ups accepted during Phases 1 and 2 and 
across each Training Group. Note. SD = Standard Deviation. 
  Malevolent Pop-Ups Genuine Pop-Ups 
Phase Condition Mean SD  Mean SD 
1 Control 56.30 .34 63.54 .39 
N-IMCIT 73.41 .31 84.31 .30 
IMCIT 81.29 .29 87.25 .29 
3 Control 67.69 .33 70.83 .35 
N-IMCIT 60.35 .31 85.29 .24 
IMCIT 70.12 .31 92.65 .11 
 
Next, we consider mean percentages of ‘genuine’ pop-ups accepted in Phases 1 and 
3, noting again that both New and Old cue malevolent pop-up data are collapsed across 
(Table 1). The percentage of genuine pop-ups accepted increased marginally in Phase 
3 across all groups. However, and as with malevolent pop-ups, the mean percentage of 
genuine pop-ups accepted in Phase 1 was markedly lower in the Control versus MCIT 
groups. A mixed 3 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Training Group as the be-
tween-subjects variable and Phase revealed a marginally non-significant main effect of 
Training Group, F(2, 47) = 3.12, MSE = .07, p = .054, and a non-significant main effect 
of Phase, F(1, 47) = 2.57, MSE = .02, p = .12. There was a non-significant interaction. 
However, these findings might again be affected by the unusual pattern of data in the 
Control condition during Phase 1 compared to the MCIT condition. Therefore, a 2 
(Training Group: MCIT, IMCIT) x 2 (Phase: 1, 3) mixed ANOVA was conducted. 
There were non-significant main effects of Training Group, F(1, 32) < 1, p = .50, and 
Phase, F(1, 32) < 1, p = .39, and a non-significant interaction, F(1, 32) < 1, p = .55.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that (1) the ability to identify genuine pop-up 
messages was high, (2) MCIT did not have any effect on this, and (3) participants in 
the Control group, in Phase 1 at least, performed quite differently (i.e., accepted fewer 
genuine pop-ups) to those in the MCIT conditions. It is difficult to determine why par-
ticipants in MCIT groups seemed to be very good at classifying most genuine pop-ups 
as genuine and then chose to accept rather than decline. It might have been relatively 
easier to check whether pop-ups contained no cues to malevolence than to check and 
register a cue(s) to malevolence. Although, and given the very high (and somewhat 
worrying) percentages of malevolent pop-ups accepted, it could be that participants, 
particularly in Phase 1, were more inclined to adopt a trusting stance [3] and accept 
most pop-ups as being genuine unless they noted at least one cue that was enough to 
raise suspension and cause them to respond in a different way (i.e., decline the pop-up. 
In order to speak to these possibilities, we will later examine the amount of time partic-
ipants took before making a decision to accept/decline messages.  
Next, we examine for possible differences between the percentage of Old (i.e., con-
tained same cue types as in Phase 1, trained on these cues in MCIT conditions in Phase 
2) versus New (i.e., contained different cue types as in Phase 1, not trained on these 
cues in MCIT conditions in Phase 2) malevolent pop-ups in Phase 3 only (Table 2). 
Whilst there is no difference within the Control Group, participants in the MCIT groups 
appear to have accepted marginally more New than Old malevolent messages, particu-
larly in the IMCIT condition. However, a 3 (Training Group) x 2 (Cue Familiarity: Old, 
New) mixed ANOVA revealed non-significant main effects of Training Group, F(2, 
47) < 1, p = .64, Cue Familiarity, F(1, 47) < 1, p = .92, and a non-significant interaction,  
F(2, 47) < 1, p = .33. Given the unusual accept/decline behavior of the Control Group 
in Phase 1 (see above), an additional analysis (2 x 2 mixed ANOVA) was conducted 
with the Control group excluded. There were still non-significant main effects of Train-
ing Group, F(1, 32) < 1, p = .36, Cue Familiarity, F(1, 32) = 1.61, p = .21, and a non-
significant interaction, F(1, 32) < 1, p = .62.  
 
Table 2. Percentage of Old and New pop-ups accepted during Phase 3 across each Training 
Group. Note. SD = Standard Deviation. 
  Malevolent Pop-Ups 
Phase Condition Mean SD  
Old Control 67.75% .34 
N-IMCIT 58.82% .35 
IMCIT 66.65% .34 
New Control 67.75% .36 
N-IMCIT 61.79% .31 
IMCIT 73.35% .30 
 
We anticipated that participants in both MCIT groups, and in particular the I-MCIT 
group would be less likely to spot new cues. However, there is no statistical evidence 
to suggest that any form of MCIT led to participants accepting more New messages, 
despite an ~11.5% higher acceptance of these in the IMCIT versus the N-IMCIT con-
dition in Phase 3. Of course, this could be a power issue, and future studies should 
consider this before ruling out the possibility that MCIT will not put people at a disad-
vantage in terms of spotting malevolent cues that they have not be trained to identify,  
 
Time to Accept/Decline Pop-Up Messages  
Next, we consider the time taken at make an accept/decline response. Noting that the 
time to accept/decline malevolent pop-ups was 5.37-s for younger adults in the [2] 
study, and 10-92-s for older adults in the [1] study. In the same studies, the times to 
accept genuine pop-ups were 5.47-s and 10.45-s respectively. Mean pop-up accept/de-
cline times for the current study are displayed in Table 3 (with one outlier removed: z-
scores >3.29, p < .001). Malevolent and genuine pop-ups, accept/decline times are no-
ticeably lower (~1-2-seconds) than in e.g., [2]. Also, response times appear to reduce 
for each Group in Phase 3 versus Phase 1. The third, and somewhat counterintuitive 
observation, is that response times are noticeably lowest (and very short) for the Control 
Group (M 3.39 Phase 1, M 2.97 Phase 3).  
A 3 (Training Group) x 2 (Phase) x 2 (Message Type) mixed factorial ANOVA re-
vealed a significant main effect of Phase, F(1, 46) = 4.55, MSE = 2.87, p = .038, with 
less time taken in Phase 3 (M = 3.62-s) than Phase 1 (M 4.13). There was a significant 
main effect of Message Type, F(1, 46) = 5.46, MSE = .45, p = .024, with more time 
spent before making an accept/decline response for malevolent (M 3.99) than genuine 
(M 3.76-s) messages. There was a non-significant main effect of Training Group, F(2, 
46) = 1.55, MSE = 4.47, p = .22, and none of the interactions were significant (ps > .08).  
 
Table 3. Time (seconds) before making an accept/decline response to Malevolent and Genuine 
pop-ups during Phases 1 and 2 and across each Training Group. Note. SD = Standard Deviation. 
  Malevolent Pop-Ups Genuine Pop-Ups 
Phase Condition Mean SD  Mean SD 
1 Control 3.45 2.65 3.33 2.23 
N-IMCIT 4.41 2.49 4.26 2.15 
IMCIT 4.77 2.99 4.57 3.05 
3 Control 3.08 1.82 2.85 1.87 
N-IMCIT 3.66 1.57 3.51 1.55 
IMCIT 4.54 3.07 4.05 2.31 
 
Contrary to our prediction, participants were faster to respond to pop-up messages 
in Phase 3 than Phase 1, and despite a non-significant Phase x Training Group interac-
tion, this was the case for the IMCIT (M Diff -0.23-s) and N-IMCIT (M Diff -0.75-s) 
groups. Given that participants in the MCIT groups did not take additional time to try 
and identify cues to malevolence in malevolent pop-up messages, the improved detec-
tion performance must have been due to increased suspicion [3] and making better use 
of the very short inspection times to identify at least one cue to rouse suspicion.  
Given much lower acceptance rates of malevolent pop-ups amongst the Control 
group in Phase 1 (Table 1), it was expected that those participants took more time to try 
and identify cues than in the MCIT groups. This was not the case. Also, their acceptance 
rate for malevolent pop-ups in Phase 3 increased by over 10% and the time taken to 
accept/decline messages reduced by almost half a second. Upon closer inspection of the 
data, three Control group participants almost always declined malevolent messages 
compared with the others whose performance was largely in line with those in the MCIT 
groups. However, they were not statistical outliers the p < .001 (z-scores > 3.29) level.  
4 Limitations 
There are limitations. First, there was no statistical evidence to suggest that those in 
the IMCIT group were better at identifying malevolent pop-ups than those in the N-
IMCIT group, despite a trend. Perhaps using a leaderboard with individual position in-
creasing after each task (e.g., 19th/20 after the first task, 1st after the last task) was not 
effective enough. This may be influenced by some participants potentially being aware 
that they were performing optimally and met with incongruent feedback to suggest oth-
erwise. Competing with other people in situ may have promoted stronger social com-
parison and led to more intense cognitive processing strategies [3]. Second, within both 
MCIT conditions, participants had to identify whether they detected malevolent cues 
and then type a number corresponding to how many. This method meant that accuracy 
of malevolent cue identical could not be measured. Third, participants had one-minute 
per training task, only five tasks to complete, with each passage containing only three 
malevolent cues. They were also aware that there would be a maximum of three malev-
olent cues. This may not have been cognitively engaging enough. Finally, Control 
group participants were treating pop-ups with higher levels of suspicion in Phase 1. 
Ideally, this condition would be re-run to check for a possibly anomalous effect.  
5 Implications 
We successfully demonstrated that MCIT can be used as an intervention to reduce 
susceptibility to potentially fraudulent computer pop-ups. More cognitively engaging 
and demanding versions of the intervention might be even more effective. Whilst an 
incentivized version of this intervention did not quite result in further improvements in 
identifying fraudulent pop-ups, an improved version that better encourages social com-
parison might work better. Whilst there was no statistical evidence to suggest that MCIT 
can impair the ability to detect malevolence cues that participants had not been trained 
on, trends indicated a performance deficit, and methods to mitigate this need to be con-
sidered in the future development of MCIT interventions. Finally, it is important to note 
that time spent viewing malevolent pop-up messages was incredibly low and the pro-
pensity to accept (rather than decline) them was alarmingly high, both pre- and post- 
intervention, and even higher than in the studies by [1] and [2]. This further emphasises 
the vital need to develop interventions to help alleviate such susceptibility.    
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